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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE – PLAIN MEANING
PRECLUDES ORDINARY MEANING
Industrial Contractors, Inc. v. Taylor
In Industrial Contractors, Inc. v. Taylor,1 Industrial Contractors, Inc.
(“ICI”) appealed a judgment from the Burleigh County District Court affirming a decision by an independent administrative law judge (“ALJ”) that
determined Leonard Taylor’s (“Taylor”) employment as an electrician with
ICI was not “seasonal employment.”2 ICI argued that the ALJ incorrectly
interpreted North Dakota Century Code § 65-01-02(5)’s use of the term
“seasonal employment.”3 The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed and
remanded the case.4 The Court agreed with ICI that the ALJ misapplied §
65-01-02(5) and that the ALJ’s decision was not based upon a preponderance of the evidence.5
ICI provided contract construction services for industrial clients.6 It
hired employees for projects by sending referral requests to local unions,
such as the Western North Dakota International Brotherhood of Electrical
Worker, Local Union 714 (“the Union”).7 ICI and the Union entered into a
Collective Bargaining Agreement, under which ICI could transfer union
members between projects.8 According to the Union’s business manager,
Randy Bartsch, ICI moved employees between projects based on the need
for workers.9 According to ICI’s safety and risk manager, Tyler Svihovec
(“Svihovec”), calling union halls for employees was part of ICI’s hiring
process.10 Svihovec testified that the “vast majority” of employees hired in
that manner were laid off when the project was completed and was “somewhat atypical” for ICI to transfer an employee to another job.11
ICI hired Taylor on March 9, 2014, after the Union referred Taylor for
a job as an electrician.12 However, Taylor and ICI disagreed about the
length of Taylor’s employment.13 According to Taylor, his referral with ICI
1. 2017 ND 183, 899 N.W.2d 680.
2. Taylor, ¶ 1, 899 N.W.2d at 681.
3. Id., 899 N.W.2d at 681-82.
4. Id., 899 N.W.2d at 682.
5. Id.
6. Id. ¶ 2.
7. Id.
8. Taylor, ¶ 2, 899 N.W.2d at 682.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. ¶ 3.
13. Id.
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was permanent, but ICI stated that it only hired Taylor for the project that
was scheduled to end May 16, 2014.14 Svihovec stated that ICI hired Taylor to temporarily work at a power plant, which was not a project that customarily operated throughout the entire year.15 Two days after being hired,
Taylor was injured while working at the power plant.16
After sustaining the injury, Taylor submitted a claim to Workforce
Safety and Insurance (“WSI”).17 WSI determined that Taylor was a seasonal employee for purposes of North Dakota Century Code § 65-0102(5).18 Therefore, WSI accepted liability for Taylor’s injuries.19 WSI
based its decision on the fact that Taylor’s job as an electrician was subject
to layoffs and was only temporary due to an estimated completion date of
May 16, 2014.20
After WSI’s decision, Taylor requested a formal hearing from an independent administrative law judge (“ALJ”), who determined that Taylor’s
employment was not seasonal, thereby reversing WSI’s decision.21 The
ALJ based its decision on the fact that electricians hired by ICI worked for
indefinite periods, meaning that they were “not permanent” employees and
they were not “seasonal employees” for purposes of § 65-01-02(5).22 The
ALJ found that ICI employed Taylor to do electrical work at the power
plant based on a regular referral and Taylor’s employment would last until
ICI would not need him.23 Subsequently, WSI petitioned for reconsideration from the ALJ, which the ALJ denied, and the Burleigh County District
Court affirmed the ALJ’s decision.24 ICI, subsequently, appealed the district court’s holding.25
On appeal to the North Dakota Supreme Court, ICI and WSI made
three arguments.26 First, they argued the ALJ misapplied the legal standard
for seasonal employment and should have determined Taylor’s job was seasonal employment under § 65-01-02(5).27 Second, they argued that the ALJ
failed to take notice of ICI’s customary practice, admitting that under the
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Taylor, ¶ 3, 899 N.W.2d at 682.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 4.
Id.
Taylor, ¶ 4, 899 N.W.2d at 682.
Id. ¶ 5.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id., ¶ 6.
Taylor, ¶ 9, 899 N.W.2d at 683.
Id.
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collective bargaining agreement ICI could have – although not customary –
transferred electricians such as Taylor, to other projects.28 Finally, ICI argued the ALJ’s decision conflicted with similar precedent.29
The North Dakota Supreme Court summed up the issue as being a
question of statutory interpretation.30 The Court looked to North Dakota
Century Code § 65-01-02(27)31 for the legislature’s definition of “seasonal
employment.”32 Section 65-01-02(27) reads “‘[s]easonal employment’ includes occupations that are not permanent or that do not customarily operate throughout the entire year. Seasonal employment is determined by what
is customary with respect to the employer at the time of injury.”33 To interpret the statutory definition, the Court took a piecemeal approach and
looked at the first and second sentences separately.34
Relying on a textual approach, the Court reasoned that the statutory
definition indicated the legislature’s intent to include occupations that were
performed during different times of the year.35 The first indication that the
legislature did not intend to limit the definition of “seasonal employment”
to one specific time of the year was its use of the phrase “includes.”36 The
term “includes” enlarged the plain meaning of the statute, making the statutory definition non-exhaustive.37 Therefore, the legislature meant for “seasonal employment” to “include[] occupations that are not permanent or that
do not customarily operate throughout the entire year.”38 Based on the
plain meaning of § 65-01-02(27), the Court found the statutory definition to
be usable, but analyzed the ordinary meaning of “seasonal employment,”
seemingly as a formality.39

28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. ¶ 10.
31. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(28) (2017).
32. See Taylor, ¶ 12, 899 N.W.2d at 684.
33. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(28).
34. See generally Taylor, ¶ 13, 899 N.W.2d at 684.
35. Id. ¶ 16, 899 N.W.2d at 685.
36. Id. ¶ 17.
37. Id.
38. Id. (citing In re Estate of Elken, 2007 ND 107, ¶ 8, 735 N.W.2d 842; Amerada Hess
Corp. v. State, 2005 ND 155, ¶ 13, 704 N.W.2d 8; Hilton v. N.D. Educ. Ass’n, 2002 ND 209, ¶
12, 655 N.W.2d 60; Matter of Estate of Leier, 524 N.W.2d 106, 110 (N.D. 1994); Americana
Healthcare Ctr. v. N.D. Dep’t of Human Serv., 510 N.W.2d 592, 594 (N.D. 1994); State v. Vermilya, 423 N.W.2d 153, 154-55 (N.D. 1988); Lucke v. Lucke, 300 N.W.2d 231, 234 (N.D. 1980);
see also NORTH DAKOTA LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING MANUAL 91 (2017) (“[a]n exhaustive definition uses the word means while a partial listing uses the word includes[;] … ‘[i]ncludes’ is not a
term of limitation”) (emphasis added).
39. Id.

2018]

NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT REVIEW

181

Also within the first sentence of § 65-01-02(27), the Court pointed out
the statutory definition’s use of the term “or.”40 The word “or” is nestled
between two conditions of employment that indicate that it is seasonal.41
The two explicit conditions for “seasonal employment” are that the employment: (1) is not permanent or (2) does not customarily operate
throughout the year.42 Therefore, the first alternative demonstrates nonpermanent employment, and the second alternative demonstrates the limitations on the time of year.43
The Court then turned to the second sentence of § 65-01-02(27), which
stated, “[s]easonal employment is determined by what is customary with
respect to the employer at the time of injury.”44 The Court relied on several
facts surrounding Taylor’s employment to determine whether the second
sentence of the statutory definition had been satisfied.45 The Court relied
on the fact that the ALJ found that “generally” ICI’s management decides
the manpower that will be needed at each project, which union halls will be
contacted to find referrals, which referrals to hire for which projects, and
the expected duration of the project.46 Svihovec stated that “most of” ICI’s
electricians are hired in the spring and fall during the power plant project
and that “all” electricians are hired for specific projects and then laid off.47
The Court recognized that Svihovec’s testimony established ICI’s custom,
thereby satisfying § 65-01-02(27)’s definition of “seasonal employment”
under the second sentence of the statute.48 The record established that ICI
hired 719 electricians from 2010 to 2015.49 Out of the 719, only 9 were
transferred to another project.50 The Court found that 9 out of 719 was too
low of a number to establish that transferring electricians was the custom
for ICI as required by § 65-01-02(27).51
Even though the text of § 65-01-02(27) was able to provide a complete
answer for the North Dakota Supreme Court to resolve the issue, the Court
then looked to the ordinary meaning of “seasonal employment” as a formal-

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Taylor, ¶ 18, 899 N.W.2d at 685-86.
Id., 899 N.W.2d at 686.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. ¶ 19.
Id.
Id.
Taylor, ¶ 26, 899 N.W.2d at 687.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 27.
Id.
Id.
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ity.52 The ordinary meaning (as opposed to the plain meaning) of “seasonal
employment” required the occupation to be carried out only during a certain
time of the year.53 The Court found the ordinary meaning of the adjective
“seasonal” in Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary,54 and found that
“seasonal” relates to the seasons of the year.55 Using the same dictionary,
the Court found that the ordinary meaning of “employment” was “the state
of being employed or occupation by which a person earns a living.”56
However, the Court found an ambiguity with the word “occupation,” but
again using the same dictionary, found that the ordinary meaning of “occupation” was “the usual or principal business of one’s life, especially as a
means of earning a living, or a vocation.”57 Finally, the majority looked to
Black’s Law Dictionary,58 and found that another meaning of “seasonal
employment” was “[a]n occupation possible only during limited parts of the
year, such as a summer-camp counselor, a baseball-park vendor, or a shopping-mall Santa.”59
As the North Dakota Supreme Court did with § 65-01-02(27), it found
that the meaning within the two dictionaries was plain and found that “the
meaning of ‘seasonal employment’ in workers’ compensation laws generally refers to occupations carried on only during certain seasons or portions of
the year and does not include occupations that can be carried on throughout
the entire year.”60 The Court then reassured its finding with the fact that
other jurisdictions have used the same ordinary meaning when applied to
various occupations.61
52. Taylor, ¶ 13, 899 N.W.2d at 684.
53. Id. ¶ 14, 899 N.W.2d at 685.
54. 1120 (11th ed. 2005).
55. Taylor, ¶ 13, 899 N.W.2d at 684.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. 605 (9th ed. 2009).
59. Taylor, ¶ 13 899 N.W.2d at 684-85.
60. Id. ¶ 14, 899 N.W.2d at 685 (citing Annot., What is “Seasonal” Employment Within Provisions of Workmen’s Compensation Act, 93 ALR 308 (1934)).
61. Id. ¶ 15. For example, Arizona courts have stated that “seasonal employment” means occupations that are engaged in only during certain times of the year, unlike timber cutting, see Pettis v. Indus. Comm’n of Ariz., 372 P.2d 72, 74-75 (Ariz. 1962), or ballet dancing, see Wozniak v.
Indus. Comm’n of Ariz., 359 P.3d 1014, 1018-20 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2015). Minnesota courts have
similarly held that “seasonal employment” means occupations that do not customarily operate
throughout the year because of their inherent nature or the local climate, unlike employment at a
part-time moving company, see Rogers v. Cedar Van Lines, Inc., 281 N.W.2d 669, 671-72 (Minn.
1979), but the case was remanded for turkey production employees, see In re Application of Land
O’ Lakes Creameries, Inc., 68 N.W.2d 256, 259-61 (Minn. 1955). The majority also looked to
other jurisdictions which held that coal delivery is not seasonal employment, Hogsett v. Cinek
Coal & Feed Co., 255 N.W. 546, 547-48 (Neb. 1934), logging is not seasonal employment, Murillo v. Payroll Express, 901 P.2d 751, 759-60 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995), dishwashing is not seasonal
employment, Froehly v. T.M. Harton Co., 139 A. 727, 729-30 (Pa. 1927), running for a judgeship
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Based on North Dakota Supreme Court’s textual interpretation of § 6501-02(27), the Court held that the ALJ failed to apply the plain meaning of
§ 65-01-02(5) to ICI’s employment of electricians.62 The Court also reasoned the ALJ’s interpretation of the statute did not give effect to every
word in the legislature’s statutory definition.63 Accordingly, the Court
found that WSI had applied the statute correctly when it determined Taylor’s employment was “seasonal employment.”64
Even though deference is shown to an agency’s statutory interpretation,
there was no such deference for the ALJ’s legal conclusions.65 In deciding
that Taylor was not a seasonal employee, the ALJ relied on the referral request form statement that a position for fourteen or less days was temporary.66 This statement was viewed as dispositive by the ALJ, whereas the
request form used “regular” employees for other positions.67 The Court
recognized that a time limitation was not imposed by § 65-01-02(5), Taylor
was a regular employee, but not a permanent employee, and was scheduled
to work until May 16, 2014.68
Because the ALJ’s determination that Taylor’s employment was not
seasonal, the determination did not comply with either the first or second
sentences of § 65-01-02(27), the Court reversed the ALJ’s decision and remanded the case back to WSI to calculate Taylor’s disability benefits under
North Dakota Century Code § 65-01-02(5) and WSI’s original order.69
However, the dissent by Justice Crothers came to exact opposite conclusions that the majority came to – simply, that the ALJ did not misapply
the law and the ALJ’s decision was supported by a preponderance of the evidence.70 The dissent reasoned that the ALJ’s interpretation of “seasonal
employment” was consistent with both the plain and ordinary meaning of
the phrase within § 65-01-02(27) as applied to the occupation of an electrician, based on the fact that ICI employed electricians regardless of the time
of year.71
was not dependent on the particular season, Nilson v. Clay City., 534 N.W.2d 598, 601-02 (S.D.
1995), and threshing is seasonal employment and thus not continuous throughout the year, Meyer
v. Roettele, 264 N.W. 191, 195 (S.D. 1935).
62. Id. ¶ 20, 899 N.W.2d at 686.
63. Id.
64. Id., ¶ 21.
65. Taylor, ¶ 23, 899 N.W.2d at 686 (citing In re Juran and Moody, Inc., 2000 ND 136, ¶¶
25-27, 613 N.W.2d 503).
66. Id. ¶ 25.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. ¶ 28, 899 N.W.2d at 687.
70. Id., ¶ 30 (Crothers, J. dissenting).
71. Taylor, ¶ 38, 899 N.W.2d at 690 (Crothers, J. dissenting).
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The dissent agreed with the majority that “[t]his case boil[ed] down to
whether the ALJ erred in finding Taylor’s employment was ‘seasonal’” under North Dakota Century Code § 65-01-02(5) and looked to North Dakota
Century Code § 65-01-02(27) for the legislature’s definition of “seasonal
employment.”72 However, where the majority took a piecemeal approach,
73 the dissent interpreted the statutory definition as a whole, concluding that
“seasonal employment includes occupations that are not permanent and is
determined by what is customary with respect to the employer’s undertaking with that occupation at the time of the injury, as opposed to the employer’s relationship with a particular individual.”74
The dissent agreed with the majority that the term “includes” enlarged
the plain meaning of the statute, and the statutory definition was not exhaustive.75 Therefore, “seasonal employment” includes occupations that
are temporary or that are not customarily performed throughout the entire
year.76 The dissent also agreed that the plain meaning was usable, but that
plain meaning was not enough, because the non-exhaustive nature of the
statute allows for judicial interpretation; therefore, the Court was free to add
additional conditions that indicated a job was seasonal.77 Regarding the
majority’s decision to interpret the two sentences of § 65-01-02(27) separately, the dissent read the two sentences of § 65-01-02(27) together and
framed the issue as “whether the employment is ‘seasonal,’ and . . . customary for the employer regarding that particular occupation and not the particular employee.”78
In regards to the second sentence of § 65-01-02(27), the dissent agreed
with the majority by relying on the fact that the ALJ found that “generally”
ICI’s management decides the manpower, which union halls to contact,
which referrals to hire, and the project’s duration.79 However, the dissent
went further by also relying on the fact that change orders were often is72. See id., ¶ 31, 899 N.W.2d at 687 (Crothers, J. dissenting) (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE §
65-01-02(28) (2010)).
73. See generally id. ¶ 13, 899 N.W.2d at 684.
74. Id. ¶ 32, 899 N.W.2d at 687 (Crothers, J. dissenting).
75. Id. ¶ 33, 899 N.W.2d at 688 (Crothers, J. dissenting).
76. Id. ¶ 17, 899 N.W.2d at 685 (citing In re Estate of Elken, 2007 ND 107, ¶ 8, 735 N.W.2d
842; Amerada Hess Corp. v. State, 2005 ND 155, ¶ 13, 704 N.W.2d 8; Hilton v. N.D. Educ.
Ass’n, 2002 ND 209, ¶ 12, 655 N.W.2d 60; Matter of Estate of Leier, 524 N.W.2d 106, 110 (N.D.
1994); Americana Healthcare Ctr. v. N.D. Dep’t of Human Serv., 510 N.W.2d 592, 594 (N.D.
1994); State v. Vermilya, 423 N.W.2d 153, 154-55 (N.D. 1988); Lucke v. Lucke, 300 N.W.2d
231, 234 (N.D. 1980); see also NORTH DAKOTA LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING MANUAL 91 (2017)
(“[a]n exhaustive definition uses the word means while a partial listing uses the word includes[;]
… ‘[i]ncludes’ is not a term of limitation”) (emphasis added).
77. Taylor, ¶ 33, 899 N.W.2d at 688 (Crothers, J. dissenting).
78. Id. ¶ 36, 899 N.W.2d at 689 (Crothers, J. dissenting).
79. Id. ¶ 37.
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sued, which created additional work and extended employment.80 Lastly,
the dissent relied on the fact that this evidence was not provided to WSI.81
The dissent also had differing views regarding Svihovec’s statement
that “most of” ICI’s electricians are hired in the spring and fall during the
power plant project and that “all” electricians are hired for specific projects
and then laid off.82 Unlike the majority who focused on the second sentence in isolation, the dissent focused on the fact that ICI hired electricians
throughout the year, and that electricians were employed during every
month of the year in one way or another.83 The dissent also relied on ICI
records that indicated electricians stayed “year round, year after year,
through the transfer process.”84 The dissent also noted that ICI was able to
hire and utilize electricians during any season of the year.85 Lastly, the dissent relied on the fact that this evidence was not provided to WSI.86
The dissent also diverged from the majority in regards to the record
which established that out of the 719 electricians that were hired by ICI, only 9 were transferred to another project.87 Unlike the majority who found
that only nine electricians were transferred, the dissent read the evidence
differently, instead of 9 people being transferred, it found that “multiple”
people were transferred and the documents cited to 9 transfer incidences as
merely an example of the number of employees transferred, rather than as
an exhaustive list that the majority presumptively understood.88 The dissent
relied on the fact that this evidence was provided to the ALJ, but was not
provided to WSI.89 The dissent determined that the weight of the evidence
supported the ALJ’s finding that ICI’s electricians generally operated
throughout the year, regardless of the season.90
Even though the text of § 65-01-02(27) was able to provide a complete
answer for the North Dakota Supreme Court to resolve the issue, the dissent
looked at the ordinary meaning as a second required step in the analysis,
unlike the majority who looked to the ordinary meaning as a mere formality.91 Like the majority, the dissent agreed that the ordinary meaning of
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. ¶ 26, 899 N.W.2d at 687.
83. Taylor, ¶ 37, 899 N.W.2d at 689 (Crothers, J. dissenting).
84. Id., 899 N.W.2d at 690 (Crothers, J. dissenting).
85. Id., 899 N.W.2d at 689 (Crothers, J. dissenting).
86. Id.
87. Id. ¶ 27, 899 N.W.2d at 687.
88. Id. ¶ 37, 899 N.W.2d at 689 (Crothers, J. dissenting) (“See, e.g. Ex. 38, Employee Nos.
61713, 61006, 61038, 61714, 61847, 61257, 61054, 61067 and 61026.”).
89. Taylor, ¶ 37, 899 N.W.2d at 890 (Crothers, J. dissenting).
90. Id.
91. Id. ¶ 13, 899 N.W.2d at 684.
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“seasonal employment” required the occupation to be carried out only during a certain time of the year.92 But where the majority looked to dictionaries, the dissent relied on a treatise on the issue that stated “the inherent seasonal nature of the employment that controls, not the claimant’s seasonal
connection with it.”93 The dissent also relied on Froehly v. T.M. Harton
Co.,94 in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held dishwashing was not
seasonal employment even though the position was at a summer amusement
park.95 Interestingly, even though the dissent was not satisfied with the
plain meaning of the North Dakota legislature’s definition of “seasonal employment,” it seemingly had no reservations about relying on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s extrinsic definition.96 In Froehly, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court looked to the Century Dictionary to determine that the word
“seasonal”:
[I]s formed from the substantive “season,” plus the adjective suffix
“al,” meaning “of the kind of” and “pertaining to,” thus making
“season,” a word pertaining to a season or a specific part of a year;
hence it may be said that a seasonal occupation is an employment
pertaining to, or of that kind of, labor exclusively performed at
specific seasons or periods of the year.97
In Froehly, the court went on to differentiate the words “causal” and
“intermittent” from “seasonal” by referencing that the first two words are
similar in that they can be done at any time of the year, but “seasonal” is reliant upon the very season of the year in which that occupation can be performed.98 The Froehly court further stressed that seasonal occupations are
contrasted with occupations that can be carried out at any time of the year,
such as dishwashing.99 The court stated:
[Dishwashing] may be, as in the present case, carried on at a summer resort for merely three months in the year . . . Appellant here
confuses the character of work . . . performed by claimant, with the

92. Id. ¶ 36, 899 N.W.2d at 689 (Crothers, J. dissenting).
93. Id. ¶ 35, 899 N.W.2d at 688 (Crothers, J. dissenting) (citing 8 Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law § 93.02[3][b]).
94. Froehly v. T.M. Harton Co., 139 A. 727, 729-30 (Pa. 1927).
95. Taylor, ¶ 35, 899 N.W.2d at 688 (Crothers, J. dissenting).
96. Id.
97. T.M. Harton Co., 139 A. at 729 (Pa. 1927).
98. Id. at 730.
99. Id.
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seasonal period during which the amusement park remained open
to the public.”100
Therefore, Justice Crothers’ dissent would have affirmed the ALJ’s
judgment.101 The dissent found that the ALJ did not misinterpret § 65-0102(27), and thus, did not misapply § 65-01-02(5) to the facts surrounding
Taylor’s employment as an electrician.102 In part, based on the facts that
ICI’s employment of electricians was not customarily dependent on the season of the year.103
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS – CITY’S
MISSTATED SCOPE OF DISTRICT IMPROVEMENTS IN A
NOTICE TO LANDOWNERS DOES NOT VIOLATE
LANDOWNER’S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS
Paving District v. City of Minot
In Paving District v. City of Minot,104 Appellant landowners sued the
City of Minot (“City”).105 The landowners claimed that the City gave them
improper notice for improvements in a paving district, and thus, the City’s
assessments to the landowners’ properties for proposed street improvements
were invalid.106 The Ward County District Court granted summary judgement in favor of the City and dismissed the landowners’ complaint.107 Additionally, the district court concluded that the landowners were barred from
bringing the action because they failed to appeal or commence the action
within the thirty-day time limit under N.D.C.C. § 40-22-43.108 The North
Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, holding that § 40-22-43 is a statute of repose.109 The Court reasoned the statute of repose meant that the thirty-day
time limit began to run when city council adopted its resolution awarding
sale of warrants to finance the improvements.110 Thus, the Court held the

100. Id.
101. Taylor, ¶ 38, 899 N.W.2d at 690 (Crothers, J. dissenting).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. 2017 ND 176, 898 N.W.2d 418.
105. Paving District, ¶ 8, 898 N.W.2d at 421.
106. Id. ¶ 1, 898 N.W.2d at 422.
107. Id. ¶ 10.
108. Id.; N.D. CENT. CODE § 40-22-43 (2017).
109. Id. ¶ 15, 898 N.W.2d at 423.; BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1423 (7th ed. 1999) (defining
a statute of repose as a “statute that bars a suit a fixed number of years after the defendant acts in
some way . . . even if this period ends before the plaintiff has suffered any injury).
110. Id. ¶ 16.
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thirty-day time limit under N.D.C.C. § 40-22-43 precluded the landowners’
claim.111 Further, the Court held that the landowners failed to establish that
the assessment proceedings violated the Due Process Clause or any other
constitutional limitation.112
The landowners made three arguments on appeal.113 First, the landowners argued that the City violated the statutory notice requirement of
N.D.C.C. § 40-22-15.114 Second, the landowners argued that the city violated the Due Process Clause because defects in their notice resulted in the
City’s failure to provide substantial and correct notice as required under the
United States Constitution.115 Third, the landowners argued that the thirtyday time limit of N.D.C.C. § 40-22-43, did not apply because the proceedings violated the North Dakota Constitution’s Gift Clause Provision.116 Ultimately, on July 12, 2017, the North Dakota Supreme Court disagreed with
all three of the landowners’ arguments.117 The Court held that the City did
not violate any constitutional limitation or restriction, the landowners’
claim was barred by the thirty-day time limit, and the proceedings did not
violate North Dakota’s Constitution’s Gift Clause.118
On October 1, 2012, the City Council of Minot approved Resolution
No. 3109, which declared the necessary improvement of Paving District
No. 476.119 The resolution provided which landowners would be specially
assessed for the improvements to the district and that those landowners
would have thirty days to file written protests.120 The resolution further explained that if a landowner chose to file a written protest within thirty days,
the city would hold a hearing to hear protests.121 A few days after the City
approved the resolution, on October 5, 2012, the City sent letters to property owners about the creation of the paving district and the proposed street
improvements.122 The letters explained the improvements as follows, “an
urban street section from 2nd St to 10th St consisting of storm sewer, curb
and gutter, asphalt paving, and street lighting.”123 Additionally, the letters
111. Paving District, ¶ 16, 898 N.W.2d at 423.
112. Id. ¶ 27, 898 N.W.2d at 426.
113. Id. ¶ 12, 898 N.W.2d at 422. (The landowners included: Paving District 476 Group,
SPCM LLC; Hudye Group LP; and Northern Plains Apartments LLC.)
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Paving District, ¶ 27, 898 N.W.2d at 426.
118. Id.
119. Id. ¶ 4, 898 N.W.2d at 421. (The Paving District is located on 36th Avenue Northeast.)
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Paving District, ¶ 4, 898 N.W.2d at 421.
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explained that the City would attribute the costs for the project to each
property owner proportionately, and the costs would not exceed the benefits
the property owners would get from the improvements.124 The letter advised the property owners that they had thirty days to protest the improvements and that a public hearing would be held on December 3, 2012.125 After the December 3, 2012 public hearing, the City Council adopted
Resolution 3250 on November 4, 2013, awarding the sale of warrants to finance the improvements.126
On June 7, 2015, the Minot Daily News published a “Notice of Costs,
Benefits, Assessments and Date of Public Hearing for the Paving District.”127 Included in this notice were maps of the special assessment district and the amount of the proposed assessment for each property.128 Several property owners attended and raised concerns at a July 6, 2015,
meeting.129 The property owners expressed concern about a change in the
scope of the area being improved and about paying for improvements to
properties outside city limits.130 The city engineer explained that the district was created and always “indicated it was going to 13th Street Northeast,
but a mistake was made when notices were sent out stating improvements
went to 10th Street Northeast.”131 Because of this mistake, the city engineer
explained that the scope of the project did not increase.132 In fact, the cost
estimates in the notices included improvements to 13th Street Northeast.133
As a result, notices were not sent again with the corrected information because the costs remained the same.134 Ultimately, at this meeting, the City
Council approved the special assessment commission report for the paving
district.135
Nearly two years after the City awarded the sale of warrants to finance
the improvements, on October 28, 2015, the landowners sued the City,
seeking a judgment declaring the assessments invalid.136 Further, the landowners asked the Ward County District Court to “hold the assessments in

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id.
Id.
Id. ¶¶ 4-5.
Id. ¶ 6, 898 N.W.2d at 421.
Id.
Paving District, ¶ 7, 898 N.W.2d at 421.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Paving District, ¶ 7, 898 N.W.2d at 421.
Id. ¶ 8.
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abeyance137 until [the City] did not include the area between 10th and 13th
Street.”138 The landowners further sought the district court’s enjoinment of
the City from certifying future assessments.139 Lastly, the landowners
claimed that the invalid notice amounted to a violation of the Due Process
Clause of the United States Constitution.140 In response, the City moved to
dismiss the complaint and argued that the landowners failed to meet jurisdictional time limitations under N.D.C.C. §§ 40-22-43, 40-26-01, and 2834-01.141 The City further argued that the landowner’s constitutional claims
were barred by Serenko v. City of Wilton.142 In favor of the City, the district
court granted summary judgement and dismissed the complaint.143 The district court reasoned that the landowners could not sue the City because the
thirty-day time limit under N.D.C.C. § 40-22-43 had passed.144 The landowners appealed to the North Dakota Supreme Court.145 The Supreme
Court addressed all three of the landowner’s arguments in turn.146
First, the Court addressed the landowners’ argument that the City violated the statutory notice requirement of N.D.C.C. § 40-22-15.147 Section
40-22-15 partly provides, “[t]he resolution must refer intelligibly to the engineer’s report and include a map of the municipality showing the proposed
improvement districts.”148 The landowners argued that the City’s mistake
in the notice regarding the extent of the proposed improvement violated §
40-22-15.149 The Court held that the action was barred by N.D.C.C. § 4022-43’s thirty-day time limit.150 Section 40-22-43 provides, “no action
shall be commenced . . . in the courts of this state . . . unless commenced
within thirty days of the adoption of the resolution of the governing board
awarding the sale of warrants to finance the improvement.”151 The Court
explained that § 40-22-43 is a statute of repose for actions based on defects
and irregularities in proceedings under N.D.C.C. § 40-22, which governs
137. Merriam-Webster defines “in abeyance” as “a state of temporary inactivity – suspension.” https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/abeyance.
138. Paving District, ¶ 8, 898 N.W.2d at 421.
139. Id.
140. Id.; U.S. CONT. amd. XIV (2017).
141. Paving District, ¶ 9, 898 N.W.2d at 422.
142. Id., Serenko v. City of Wilton, 1999 ND 88, 593 N.W.2d 368 (holding there is no constitutional right to notice when a city initially decides to construct an improvement).
143. Paving District, ¶ 10, 898 N.W.2d at 422.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. ¶ 12.
147. Id. ¶ 13.
148. Id.; N.D. CENT. CODE § 40-22-43 (2017).
149. Paving District, ¶ 13, 898 N.W.2d at 423.
150. Id. ¶ 16.
151. Id. ¶ 15.
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the creation of the improvement district.152 The court reasoned that the
landowners’ complaint involved the creation of an improvement district because they sought to invalidate the assessments, due to the City’s failure to
comply with the notice requirements under N.D.C.C. § 40-22-15.153 Additionally, the Court explained that the thirty-day time limit began when the
City adopted the resolution.154 Thus, the Court held that since the time limit began when the City adopted the resolution, the landowners’ complaint
came too late and was barred by the thirty-day time limit.155 Since the
landowners’ claim was refuted by the time limit, the Court did not evaluate
whether the mistake violated the notice requirement of § 40-22-15.156
Second, the Court addressed the landowners’ argument that the City
violated the Due Process Clause because defects in their notice resulted in
the City’s failure to provide substantial and correct notice as required under
the U.S. Constitution.157 The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution, states that no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law . . . .”158 The North Dakota Supreme
Court case, Serenko v. City of Wilton, interpreted N.D.C.C. § 40-22-43 and
addressed a claim that a defect in a notice of the creation of an assessment
district constituted a violation of constitutional due process rights.159 In Serenko, the Court found no due process violation and that such action was
barred by the thirty-day time limit under § 40-22-43.160 The Court held that
there is no constitutional right to notice when a city initially decides to construct an improvement, but there still must be notice and an opportunity to
be heard at some point before the individual assessment becomes final.161
The Court explained that § 40-22-15 provides more for landowners in terms
of notice than the United States Constitution’s notice requirements.162
Thus, the Court came to three conclusions.163 First, the Court held that §
40-22-15 provides only a statutory right to notice of the resolution.164 Second, the Court held that a violation of the statutory right to notice did not
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Paving District, ¶ 16, 898 N.W.2d at 423.
156. Id. ¶ 14.
157. Id. ¶ 17.
158. Id. ¶ 18, 898 N.W.2d at 423-424; N.D. CONST. art. I Sec. 12 (stating, “No person shall
. . . be deprived of life, liberty of property without due process of law.”).
159. Paving District, ¶ 19, 898 N.W.2d at 424.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
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give rise to a due process violation.165 Last, the Court held that the action
was barred by the thirty-day time limit.166
In applying Serenko to this case, the Court came to three conclusions.167 First, there is no constitutional right to notice when a municipality
initially decides to construct an improvement.168 Second, the creation of an
improvement district and the making of the improvement alone does not
deprive an individual of personal or property rights.169 Third, even though
state law provides it, the landowners do not have a constitutional right to
notice and an opportunity to be heard.170 Ultimately, the Court held that if
there was a violation, it was statutory in nature and thus, there was no constitutional violation.171
Third, the Court addressed the landowners’ argument that the thirtyday time limit of N.D.C.C. § 40-22-43 did not apply because the proceedings violated the North Dakota Constitution’s Gift Clause Provision.172 The
landowners argued that the City improperly gifted some of the property
owners because they received a benefit of the improvement and were not
required to pay any assessment.173 The Gift Clause is found in article X,
section 18 of the North Dakota Constitution and states, “[N]either the state
nor any political subdivision thereof shall otherwise loan or give its credit
or make donations to or in aid of any individuals, association or corporation
. . . .”174 In applying the principles of statutory construction to interpret the
meaning of the Gift Clause, the Court held that the paving district was for a
public purpose, and thus, the City did not violate the Gift Clause.175 The
Court explained that the plain language of the provision “explicitly allows a
city to make internal improvements.”176 Internal improvements include
projects on public road and highways.177 Furthermore, the provisional restriction of loans, credits, and donations “does not apply to legislation for
the making of internal improvements.”178 Since the paving project related
to public improvement, the Court held that “the gift clause simply does not
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Paving District, ¶ 19, 898 N.W.2d at 424.
Id.
Id. ¶ 21.
Id., 898 N.W.2d at 425.
Id.
Id.
Paving District, ¶ 21, 898 N.W.2d at 425.
Id. ¶ 22.
Id.
Id. ¶ 23.
Id. ¶ 25.
Id.
Paving District, ¶ 25, 898 N.W.2d at 425.
Id.; Northwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Wentz, 103 N.W.2d 245, 253-54 (N.D. 1960).
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encompass such claims.”179 Thereafter, the North Dakota Supreme Court
affirmed the District Court, holding that the assessment proceedings did not
violate the Due Process Clause and the landowners’ action was barred by §
40-22-15’s thirty-day time limit.180
Chief Justice VandeWalle concurred181 in the judgement, expressing
concern with the error in the notice and the fact that the City did not
acknowledge the error until much later than the thirty-day time limit imposed on the landowners by § 40-22-43.182 In explaining that his concern
was not enough to provide a remedy for the landowners, Chief Justice
VandeWalle provided clarification as to what the Court meant by classifying § 40-22-43 as a statute of repose.183 Chief Justice VandeWalle explained that a statute of repose is designed to “bar[] a suit a fixed number of
years after the defendant acts in some way . . . even if this period ends before the plaintiff has suffered any injury.”184 Thus, since § 40-22-43 is a
statute of repose, the landowners were barred from bringing this claim before they became aware of the mistake in the City’s notice. Furthermore,
Chief Justice VandeWalle compared a statute of repose with a statute of
limitation by explaining that, “If § 40-22-43 were a statute of limitation, the
time for bringing an action to contest the proceeding might be held to run
from the time the [landowners] were notified or otherwise discovered the
error in the notice.”185 Thus, with § 40-22-43 the legislature barred the
landowners from a remedy before they knew they needed a remedy.186 Ultimately, the Court could not impose a remedy for such error because the
authority lies with the legislature.187
CRIMINAL LAW – RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL
State v. Gibson
In State v. Gibson,188 Steven Gibson (“Gibson”) appealed from a criminal judgment entered upon his conditional guilty plea after the district court

179. Paving District, ¶ 25, 898 N.W.2d at 425.
180. Id. ¶ 27, 898 N.W.2d at 426.
181. Justice Crothers joined Chief Justice VandeWalle’s concurrence.
182. Paving District, ¶ 30, 898 N.W.2d at 426.
183. Id.
184. Id.; BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1423 (7th ed. 1999).
185. Paving District, ¶ 30. 898 N.W.2d at 426; see Iverson v. Lancaster, 158 N.W.2d 507
(N.D. 1968).
186. Paving District, ¶ 30, 885 N.W.2d at 426.
187. Id.
188. 2017 ND 15, 889 N.W.2d 852.
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rejected his claim that the State violated his right to a speedy trial.189 The
North Dakota Supreme Court held that under North Dakota Century Code §
29-19-02, the ninety-day period for a speedy trial begins when the district
court and the state’s attorney receive the request for a speedy trial.190 The
Court also held that the eleven-day delay by the North Dakota Department
of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“the DOC”) in sending the request was
not sufficient to indicate a violation of Gibson’s right to a speedy trail.191
On October 2, 2015, Gibson submitted the request for a speedy trial to
the DOC.192 On October 13, 2015, the Department mailed the request to
the South Central Judicial District Court, Burleigh County, and the Burleigh
County State’s Attorney.193 The district court received the request on October 15, 2015, thirteen days after Gibson submitted his request. The state’s
attorney received the request on October 16, 2015, fourteen days after the
request was submitted to the DOC. Gibson’s trial was set for January 6,
2016, which was ninety-six days after Gibson submitted his request and
eighty-two days after the district court and state’s attorney received the request.194 Gibson argued that his right to a speedy trial was violated and
moved to dismiss the charges.195
The issue of the case came down to the meaning of the term “elects” in
North Dakota Century Code § 29-19-02.196 The statute demands that “the
trial to begin within ninety days of the date the party elects this right.”197
Gibson argued that he elected his right when he submitted the request to the
DOC.198 Specifically he argued that the district court should have scheduled his trial within ninety days of his request submission to the DOC, not
within ninety days of the district court and state’s attorney receiving the request.199 The State argued, however, that Gibson elected his right when the
district court and the state’s attorney’s office received the request.200
Agreeing with the State, the Court held that the defendant elected his
right to a speedy trial when the district court and the state’s attorney re-

189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

Gibson, ¶ 1, 889 N.W.2d at 852-53.
Id., 889 N.W.2d at 853.
Id. ¶ 7, 889 N.W.2d at 854.
Id. ¶ 3.
Gibson, ¶ 3, 889 N.W.2d at 853.
Id.
Id. ¶ 4.
Id.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-19-02 (2017).
Gibson, ¶ 4, 889 N.W.2d at 853.
Id. ¶ 5.
Id.
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ceived the party’s request.201 Accordingly, the Court found that the state
did not violate Gibson’s right to a speedy trial.202 Because there was no
clear guidance on the issue from either the North Dakota Legislature or
North Dakota Supreme Court precedence, the Court’s reasoning was based
on common law outside of the statute.203 The two cases the Court looked to
for guidance were State v. Ripley204 and State v. Moe.205
Ripley was a question of interpretation regarding the Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act (“the Detainers Act”), specifically § 2933-03 of the North Dakota Century Code.206 Similar to the statute at issue
in Gibson, the statute in Ripley contained an ambiguous ninety-day provision.207 The Court in Ripley found that “[t]he clear purpose of the Detainers
Act is to require prompt disposition of criminal charges against inmates.”208
The Court also recognized the purpose of uniformity general to all uniform
statutes.209 Accordingly, the Court looked to Colorado,210 Kansas,211 and
Missouri212 for guidance.213 Based on the other jurisdictions interpretation
of the Detainers Act, the Court in Ripley held that the ninety-day provision
began to run when the district court and the state’s attorney received the request.214
In Moe, the applicable statute was the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (“the IAD”), codified under § 29-34-01 of the North Dakota Century
Code.215 The defendant was incarcerated in Colorado, but was charged with
a crime in North Dakota, for an unrelated incident.216 The defendant requested a speedy disposition on his detainer which was an ambiguous 180day provision.217 The officials in Colorado failed to send the request to the
North Dakota officials or the North Dakota State’s Attorney.218 The Court
in Moe looked to the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

Id.
Id.
Id., 889 N.W.2d at 853-54.
State v. Ripley, 548 N.W.2d 24 (N.D. 1996).
State v. Moe, 1998 ND 137, 581 N.W.2d 468.
Ripley, 548 N.W.2d at 26.
Id.
Id.
Id.
People v. Lopez, 587 P.2d 792, 795 (1978).
Pierson v. State, 502 P.2d 721, 726 (1972).
State ex rel. Kemp v. Hodge, 629 S.W.2d 353, 360 (Mo. 1982).
Ripley, 548 N.W.2d at 26.
Id. at 27.
Moe, ¶ 3, 581 N.W.2d at 470.
Id. ¶ 1, 581 N.W.2d at 469-70.
Id. ¶ 15, 581 N.W.2d at 472.
Id. ¶ 4, 581 N.W.2d at 470.
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IAD which stated that the IAD’s 180-day provision begins to run when “the
request is actually delivered to officials of the state where charges are pending.”219 The Court in Moe subsequently held that because the North Dakota
officials never received the request, the 180 days provision never began to
run.220
In the present case, Gibson also argued that his charges should be dismissed because North Dakota Century Code § 29-33-02 requires the DOC
to “forthwith”221 a detainee’s request for disposition of pending charges to
the district court and state’s attorney.222 The Court drew attention to the
ambiguity with the term “forthwith” in the statute. However, the Court
found that of the fourteen days between the DOC receiving the request from
Gibson and the prosecutor receiving the request from the DOC, eleven of
those days were caused by delays within the DOC and three of those days
were time the request spent traveling through the mail.223 Gibson asked the
Court to consider this statute, together with his request for a speedy trial,
and find that the submission of the request to the DOC was intended by the
legislature to indicate that receipt by the DOC was meant to begin the ninety-day countdown.224 The Court disagreed with Gibson and refused to hold
that they referred to the same right to a speedy trial.225 However, the Court
did hold that the fourteen day period was “prompt” and did not alter the
start of the ninety days to which the State and Gibson were entitled.226
In addition, Chief Justice VandeWalle wrote a special concurrence.227
He wanted to point out the importance of the DOC to forward mail “forthwith.”228 Chief Justice VandeWalle pointed out that the DOC has a duty, as
a part of the state under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Consti-

219. Id. ¶ 16, 581 N.W.2d at 472.
220. Id. ¶ 17.
221. N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-33-02 (2017) states that:
The request must be delivered to the warden or other official having custody of the
prisoner, who shall forthwith: (1) Certify the term of commitment under which the
prisoner is being held, the time already served on the sentence, the time remaining to
be served, the good time earned, the time of parole eligibility of the prisoner, and any
decisions of the state parole board relating to the prisoner; and (2) Send by registered
or certified mail, return receipt requested, one copy of the request and certificate to the
court and one copy to the prosecuting official to whom it is addressed. (emphasis added).
222. Gibson, ¶ 7, 889 N.W.2d at 854.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. ¶ 10.
228. Gibson, ¶ 10, 889 N.W.2d at 854.
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tution and Article I, section 12 of the North Dakota Constitution.229 The
Chief Justice’s concurrence noted that the Court was unaware of the normal
time that prisoners’ letters were usually mailed by the DOC, but that its
failure to be “forthwith” may result in a deprivation of the prisoners’
rights.230 In the present case, however, the Chief Justice found the elevenday delay of receipt and dispatch of Gibson’s request was not enough to
demonstrate that it was not mailed “forthwith” and therefore, did not deprive Gibson of his right to a speedy trial.231
FAMILY LAW – CONTEMPT ORDERS – MAXIMUM LENGTH OF
IMPRISONMENT
Nygaard v. Taylor
In Nygaard v. Taylor,232 Appellant, Trisha Taylor (“Taylor”), appealed
a Cass County District Court order denying Taylor’s motion to quash contempt orders and Taylor’s motion for her immediate release from incarceration.233 The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed, holding that as a matter
of first impression, Taylor could not be imprisoned longer than the statutory
six-month limit, even though she continued to be in contempt of the court’s
order.234 The district court found Taylor in contempt for violating multiple
district court orders by refusing to return her minor children to their fathers,
Aarion Nygaard (“Nygaard”) and Terance Stanley (“Stanley”).235
In 2007, Taylor and Stanley became parents to a child, and two years
later, in 2009, they married.236 In 2011, Taylor and Stanley divorced.237
Although they never married, Taylor had a child with Nygaard in 2013.238
Stanley and Nygaard had primary residential responsibility of their respective children, and Taylor had supervised visitation rights.239 Taylor, Stanley, and Nygaard all resided in Fargo, North Dakota.240 Since September of
2014, Stanley and Nygaard did not have contact with their children because

229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

Id.
Id. ¶ 11, 889 N.W.2d at 855.
Id.
2017 ND 206, 900 N.W.2d 834.
Nygaard, ¶ 1, 900 N.W.2d at 834.
Id. ¶¶ 12, 20, 900 N.W.2d at 836, 839.
Id. ¶ 3, 900 N.W.2d at 834.
Id. ¶ 2.
Id.
Id.
Nygaard, ¶ 2, 900 N.W.2d at 834.
Id.
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Taylor fled with both of the minor children to the Cheyenne River Indian
Reservation in South Dakota.241
The district court found Taylor in contempt for violating multiple district court orders by refusing to return her minor children to their respective
fathers.242 Taylor had been incarcerated in North Dakota since November
of 2014, as she was arrested and pled guilty to parental kidnapping, a class
C felony.243 In November of 2015, shortly before Taylor was to be released
on parole, the District Court issued interlocutory orders in the two custody
cases finding Taylor in contempt for refusing to return the children to their
respective fathers.244 Upon Taylor’s release, she was arrested for contempt.245 Taylor remained incarcerated until the North Dakota Supreme
Court decided this case.246
In January of 2016, the judicial referee disagreed with Taylor’s argument that she was unable to return her children to their respective fathers.247
Specifically, the referee found Taylor was “voluntarily electing to continue
to withhold” the minor children.248 In March of 2016, the judicial referee
order confirmed the prior ruling, which ordered Taylor to “remain in custody until such time as she returns the minor child[ren] to” their respective
fathers.249 Next, in April of 2016, the District Court adopted and affirmed
the judicial referee’s orders, and Taylor did not appeal.250 Six months later,
in October of 2016, Taylor filed motions to quash the contempt orders and
moved to be immediately released from prison.251 Taylor argued that her
imprisonment of over four hundred days for contempt exceeded the sixmonth limit imposed by N.D.C.C. § 27-10-01.4(1)(b).252 Specifically, § 2710-01.4(1)(b), limits imprisonment as a remedial sanction for continuing
contempts to “extend for as long as the contemnor continues the contempt
or six months, whichever is shorter.”253
241. Id.
242. Id. ¶ 3.
243. Id.
244. Id. ¶ 4.
245. Nygaard, ¶ 4, 900 N.W.2d at 834.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Nygaard, ¶ 5, 900 N.W.2d at 835.
252. Id.; N.D. CENT. CODE. § 27-10-01.4(1)(b) (2017) states:
A court may impose one or more of the following remedial sanctions: (b) Imprisonment if the contempt of court is of a type included in subdivision b, c, d, e, or f of subsection 1 of section 27-10-01.4. The imprisonment may extend for as long as the contemnor continues the contempt or six months, whichever is shorter.
253. Nygaard, ¶ 17, 900 N.W.2d at 838; N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-10-01.4(1)(b) (2017).
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In addressing Taylor’s appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court conceptualized the issue as “whether Taylor is entitled to be released from confinement because she has served more than the six consecutive months in
prison allowed under §27-10-01.4.”254 The Court explained that the issue
was a question of first impression in this jurisdiction because the case involved “a district court’s authority to incarcerate persons found to be in
contempt of court indefinitely.”255 The Court considered the issue to be of
“vital concern regarding matters of important public interest.”256
The Court first looked to Wisconsin’s contempt system for guidance.257
The Court looked at the similarity between North Dakota and Wisconsin
contempt statutes, as well as, the Wisconsin Supreme Court case, Kenosha
Unified School District No. 1 v. Kenosha Ed. Ass’n.258 Specifically, the
Court explained that in addition to basing North Dakota contempt law on
Wisconsin contempt law, the Wisconsin contempt statute § 785.04(1) is
“substantially identical” to North Dakota’s § 27-10-01.4(1).259 The principles of Wisconsin’s contempt statute § 785.04(1) were clarified in the Kenoshsa case.260
In Kenosha, the Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded that a fine imposed against a contemnor could not exceed the statutory maximum of
$250.261 With this analysis, the North Dakota Supreme Court determined
that although courts, including the North Dakota Supreme Court, have recognized a courts’ inherent contempt powers, those powers may be limited
by the legislature.262 The Court explained that such limitation exists in §
27-10-01.4(1)(b).263 Specifically § 27-10-01.4(1)(b) limits imprisonment as
a remedial sanction for continuing contempt to “extend for as long as the
contemnor continues the contempt or six months, whichever is shorter.”264
Next, the Court addressed Nygaard’s and Stanley’s reliance on subdivision (d) of § 27-10-01.4.265 Nygaard and Stanley argued that imprisonment

254. Nygaard, ¶ 14, 900 N.W.2d at 837.
255. Id. ¶ 12, 900 N.W.2d at 836.
256. Id.
257. Id. ¶ 15, 900 N.W.2d at 837.
258. Id.; Kenosha Unified School Dist. No. 1 v. Kenosha Ed. Ass’n., 234 N.W.2d 311
(1975).
259. Nygaard, ¶ 15, 900 N.W.2d at 837; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 785.04(1) (West 2001).
260. Nygaard, ¶ 15, 900 N.W.2d at 837.
261. Id. ¶ 16.
262. Id. ¶ 17, 900 N.W.2d at 838.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id. ¶ 18, 900 N.W.2d at 839; N.D. CENT. CODE. § 27-10-01.4(1)(d) (2017) (“A court
may impose one or more of the following remedial sanctions: (d) An order designed to ensure
compliance with a previous order of the court.”).
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could be extended beyond six months if the sanction is “designed to ensure
compliance with a previous order of the court.”266 The Supreme Court rejected this argument explaining “[t]o read subdivision (d) as allowing imprisonment beyond six months would render the specific limitations in subdivision (b) superfluous.”267
Lastly, the Court ruled out subdivision (e) as justifying Taylor’s imprisonment for over six months.268 The Supreme Court explained that subdivision (e) does not permit imprisonment beyond six months.269 The legislature has also taken into account that courts may exercise inherent
authority beyond the six-month limitation for imprisonment “if the court
expressly finds that [the six-month limitation] would be ineffectual to terminate a continuing contempt.”270 However, the Court explained that neither the judicial referee orders nor any district court orders expressly found
that imprisonment for six months under § 27-10-01.4(1)(b) would be ineffectual to terminate Taylor’s continuing contempt.271 Thus, the Court reasoned that without such express finding, Taylor could not be imprisoned for
more than six months.272
Thus, the North Dakota Supreme Court reversed, holding that the judicial referee erred in denying Taylor’s motion of immediate release from incarceration.273
FAMILY LAW – TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS EQUALS A
MATERIAL CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES – GRANDPARENT
HAS NO RIGHT TO VISIT GRANDCHILDREN AFTER A
FATHER’S PARENTAL RIGHTS ARE TERMINATED
Kulbacki v. Michael
In Kulbacki v. Michael,274 Amanda Kulbacki (“Kulbacki”) appealed
the Grand Forks County District Court’s judgment, which denied
Kulbacki’s motion to terminate the visitation rights of her child’s paternal

266. Nygaard, ¶ 17, 900 N.W.2d at 838; N.D. CENT CODE § 27-10-01.4(1)(d) (2017).
267. Nygaard, ¶ 18, 900 N.W.2d at 839.
268. Id. ¶ 19; N.D. CENT. CODE. § 27-10-01.4(1)(d) (2017) (“A court may impose one or
more of the following remedial sanctions: (e) A sanction other than the sanctions specified in subdivisions a through d if the court expressly finds that those sanctions would be ineffectual to terminate a continuing contempt.”)
269. Nygaard, ¶ 19, 900 N.W.2d at 839.
270. Id.
271. Id. ¶ 20.
272. Id.
273. Id. ¶ 21.
274. 2017 ND 184, 899 N.W.2d 643.
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grandparents after the father’s parental rights were terminated.275 Kulbacki
argued that the termination of the father’s parental rights resulted in a material change in circumstances.276 The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed
and remanded part of the district court’s judgment.277
In 2012, Amanda Kulbacki was pregnant when she divorced Nicholas
Michael (“Michael”).278 Michael was incarcerated during the child’s
birth.279 Michael and his mother, Shawn Coulter (“Coulter”), used § 14-0905.1280 of the North Dakota Century Code to request grandparent visitation
after the child was born.281 Subsequently, Kulbacki started the process to
terminate Michael’s parental rights in Maricopa County, Arizona because
that is where she and the child resided.282
Upon review, the district court in Grand Forks County held in Coulter’s
favor.283 Thus, Coulter was awarded unsupervised visitation for one-half
hour each day Kulbacki visited Grand Forks, North Dakota.284 The district
court reasoned that Kulbacki failed to demonstrate that the child’s best interests would be interfered with from limited grandparent visitation.285
Kulbacki appealed that ruling to the North Dakota Supreme Court, which
held the “district court improperly placed the burden on Kulbacki to show
grandparent visitation was not in the child’s best interests.”286 As a result,
the Court remanded the issue to the district court with the burden switched
to Coulter to demonstrate visitation was in the child’s best interest and
would not interfere with the parent-child relationship.287
Upon remand, the district court again awarded Coulter a thirty-minute
visitation with her grandchild for each day Kulbacki visited Grand Forks,

275. Kulbacki, ¶ 1, 899 N.W.2d at 644.
276. Id. ¶ 8, 899 N.W.2d at 646.
277. Id. ¶ 18, 899 N.W.2d at 648.
278. Id. ¶ 2, 899 N.W.2d at 645.
279. Id.
280. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-05.1(1)-(2) (2017) states:
The grandparents and great-grandparents of an unmarried minor child may be granted
reasonable visitation rights to the child by the district court upon a finding that visitation would be in the best interests of the child and would not interfere with the parentchild relationship. The court shall consider the amount of personal contact that has occurred between the grandparents or great-grandparents and the child and the child’s
parents.
281. Kulbacki, ¶ 2, 899 N.W.2d at 644-45.
282. Id., 899 N.W.2d at 645.
283. Id. ¶ 3.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id. (quoting Kulbacki v. Michael, 2014 ND 83, ¶ 10, 845 N.W.2d 625 (N.D. 2014)).
287. Kulbacki, ¶ 3, 899 N.W.2d at 645.
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North Dakota.288 Specifically, the ruling was held in Coulter’s favor because the district court determined that Kulbacki had interfered with Coulter’s attempts to have any type of contact with her grandchild.289
After the district court issued its second holding, the Arizona Superior
Court terminated Michael’s parental rights.290 As a result, Kulbacki moved
to terminate the grandparent visitation order.291 Kulbacki argued that Coulter had no relationship with the child.292 Specifically, Kulbacki stated that
Coulter had not met the child and was not the child’s legal grandparent.293
Additionally, Kulbacki moved the district court to remove Michael’s name
from the child’s birth certificate.294 The district court ruled against
Kulbacki because it found no material change in circumstances since the
last ruling.295 As a result, Kulbacki appealed to the North Dakota Supreme
Court.296
First, in her appeal to the North Dakota Supreme Court, Kulbacki argued that the district court erred in deciding a material change in circumstances did not occur since the district court’s second ruling.297 Kulbacki
believed a material change in circumstances existed due to Michael’s parental rights being terminated.298 As a result of Michael’s terminated parental
rights, Kulbacki argued that Coulter’s visitation rights should also be terminated because she is not the child’s legal grandparent.299
The Court used §14-09-05.1 of the North Dakota Century Code because it concerns a grandparent’s right to visit a minor grandchild.300 However, this section fails to address the modification of a grandparent’s visitation with a minor grandchild.301 Additionally, the North Dakota Supreme
Court had not addressed this issue prior to hearing this case.302 As a result,
the Court looked to other jurisdictions for guidance and found that courts
have analogized to the modification of parenting time when determining the

288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.

Id. ¶ 4.
Id.
Id. ¶ 5.
Id.
Id.
Kulbacki, ¶ 5, 899 N.W.2d at 645; see also N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-05.1 (2017).
Kulbacki, ¶ 5, 899 N.W.2d at 645.
Id.
Id. ¶ 1, 899 N.W.2d at 644.
Id. ¶ 6, 899 N.W.2d at 645.
Id. ¶¶ 6, 8, 899 N.W.2d at 645, 646.
Id. ¶ 6, 899 N.W.2d at 645.
Kulbacki, ¶ 7, 899 N.W.2d at 645.
Id.
Id.
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modification of grandparent visitation.303 The Court relied on Bredeson v.
Mackey304 and stated “[a] modification of parenting time requires material
change in circumstances that has occurred since the prior order, and modification of the order is necessary to serve the child’s best interests.”305 Accordingly, since the grandchild and Coulter have had no personal contact,
the Court only needed to determine if a material change in circumstances
had occurred.306
The North Dakota Supreme Court held that “the termination of a parent’s rights is a material change in circumstances as a matter of law in a
proceeding relating to the modification of grandparent visitation.”307 The
Court reasoned, “a decree terminating parental rights severs all legal ties between the natural parent and the child.”308 Thus, the termination of Michael’s parental rights meant that Coulter was no longer the child’s legal
grandparent.309 Consequently, the Court overturned the district court’s holding because a material change in circumstances had occurred.310
Next, the Court determined if Coulter could use the North Dakota Century Code’s § 14-09-05.1(2) to establish a visitation right with her grandchild.311 Section 14-09-05.1 states “[t]he court shall consider the amount of
personal contact that has occurred between the grandparents or greatgrandparents and the child and the child’s parents.312 Here the Court relied
on Troxel v. Granville, which stated, “the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children.”313 In this
case, Coulter had never met her grandchild, had no contact with her grandchild, and Kulbacki did not want Coulter to have a relationship with her
grandchild.314 Consequently, Coulter lacked personal contact with the
grandchild, which meant Coulter could not use § 14-09-05.1 to establish a
right to visit her grandchild.315

303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
(2000).
314.
315.

Id.
2014 ND 25, ¶ 6, 842 N.W.2d 860.
Kulbacki, ¶ 7, 899 N.W.2d at 645-46.
Id.
Id. ¶ 11, 899 N.W.2d at 647.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Kulbacki, ¶ 13, 899 N.W.2d at 647.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-05.1(2) (2017).
Kulbacki, ¶ 13, 899 N.W.2d at 647 (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66
Id. ¶ 13.
Id.
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Lastly, the Court determined if the Grand Forks County District Court
had jurisdiction to order the North Dakota Department of Vital Statistics to
amend the child’s birth certificate to reflect Michael’s terminated parental
rights.316 Kulbacki argued that the district court erred when it determined it
did not have jurisdiction to amend the birth certificate.317 Kulbacki filed the
Arizona order that terminated Michael’s parental rights in Grand Forks
County.318 Section 28.20.1-02 of the North Dakota Century Code states
that an order from another state filed under this section has “the same effect
. . . as a judgment of a district court of any county of this state.”319 Thus,
because the Arizona order was filed under § 28.20.1-02, the order became a
North Dakota order.320 Accordingly, Michael’s parental rights were terminated when Kulbacki filed the order in North Dakota.321
Because Michaels’ parental rights were terminated, the Court held the
district court had proper subject matter jurisdiction, meaning that it had authority to determine the case.322 Sections 23-02.1-25(1) and (3) of the
North Dakota Century Code provided the district court’s authority to amend
a birth record if it follows governing statutes and regulations.323 Thus, the
Court remanded the amendment of the birth certificate to the district
court.324 Overall, the Court held that when a father loses his parental rights,
his parents lose their right to visit the grandchild.325

316. Id. ¶ 14.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28.20.1-02 (2017); see also Kulbacki, ¶ 14, 899 N.W.2d at 647.
320. Kulbacki, ¶ 15, 899 N.W.2d at 648.
321. Id.
322. Id. ¶ 17.
323. Id.; see also N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-02.1-25(1), (3) (2017) which states:
A record registered under this chapter may be amended only in accordance with this
chapter and regulations under this chapter adopted by the state department of health to
protect the integrity and accuracy of vital records. … Upon receipt of a certified copy
of a court order that is amending a birth, death, or fetal death record and upon request
of such individual or the individual’s parent, guardian, or legal representative, the state
registrar shall amend the record as directed in the court order; however, if the state
registrar has information to believe the facts of the court order are false or inaccurate,
the state registrar shall provide the court and any known parties with the correct information.
324. Kulbacki, ¶ 17, 899 N.W.2d at 648 (allowing remand for Kulbacki to brief the authority
regarding the termination of Michael’s parental rights and amending the child’s birth certificate).
325. Id. ¶1, 899 N.W.2d at 644.
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GOVERNMENT - COUNTIES - INTERVENTION NEEDED BECAUSE
OF GREAT PUBLIC INTEREST – COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
AUTHORITY TO FIRE LOCAL SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT
EMPLOYEES
Schwartzenberger v. McKenzie County
In Schwartzenberger v. McKenzie County,326 Gary Schwartzenberger
(“Schwartzenberger “) appealed a district court judgment denying him a
writ to prohibit the McKenzie County Board of County Commissioners
(“Board”) from taking disciplinary action up to and including termination
against a sheriff’s office deputy.327 The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed, finding that the Board did not have the authority to discipline or
terminate a sheriff’s office deputy.328
In November 2014, Gary Schwartzenberger became the McKenzie
County sheriff.329 In May of 2016, a sheriff’s office employee complained
to the McKenzie County human resource director about bullying and retaliation that occurred within the sheriff’s office.330 The Board conducted an
internal investigation of the sheriff’s office by contracting with the Village
Business Institute.331 After the investigation results were received, the
Board unanimously decided “‘to take disciplinary action against Lt. Michael Schmitz up to and including termination, pending a response within
10 days, and a final determination by this board,’ and to place Lt. Schmitz
‘on administrative leave immediately and unpaid administrative leave beginning the October 16, 2016, payroll.’”332 Additionally, the Board asked
the acting state’s attorney to prepare a motion for Schwartzenberger’s removal by the governor.333
In response, Schwartzenberger asked the district court to prohibit the
Board from taking additional actions on its motions because he believed the
Board surpassed its jurisdiction and acted unlawfully.334 The district court
denied Schwartzenberger’s writ of prohibition petition.335 Specifically, the
district court held that the Board had the power to investigate the sheriff’s

326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.

2017 ND 211, 901 N.W.2d 64.
Schwartzenberger. ¶ 1, 901 N.W.2d at 65.
Id.
Id. ¶ 2.
Id.
Id.
Id., 901 N.W.2d at 65-66.
Schwartzenberger, ¶ 2, 901 N.W.2d at 66.
Id. ¶ 3.
Id. ¶ 4.
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office and ask the state’s attorney to prepare a petition requesting the governor’s removal of Sheriff Schwartzenberger.336 Furthermore, the district
court held disciplinary action against Lt. Schmitz was within the Board’s
authority.337
First, the North Dakota Supreme Court determined whether the issue
regarding authority to discipline and terminate employees was moot.338 The
Board’s position was that this issue was moot because Lt. Schmitz had already been terminated for unrelated reasons.339 However, Schwartzenberger, acting in his official capacity as sheriff, claimed the issue was not
moot because the Board surpassed its jurisdiction by meddling with the internal operations of the sheriff’s office.340
The Court agreed with Schwartzenberger and held that the issue was
not moot because it involved a great public interest in which intervention
was needed between elected county commissioners and elected sheriffs.341
Specifically, the Court reasoned that this issue was of great public interest
because it involved public officials’ power and authority.342 The Court explained that this power and authority had the possibility of developing into
a nonstop-cycle if it continued to evade review.343 Here, the Court determined that although Lt. Schmitz no longer worked for the sheriff’s office
for unrelated reasons, this issue involving the Board’s scope of authority to
discipline and terminate employees was not moot.344 The Court reasoned
that the Board’s scope of authority was interrelated and overlapped with the
elected sheriff’s authority.345
Next, the North Dakota Supreme Court determined whether the Board
had the authority to discipline employees from a local sheriff’s office.346
Schwartzenberger argued that the disciplinary action taken by the Board,
against his sheriff’s office, was beyond the Board’s authority.347 In response, the Board argued that it had a duty to supervise county officers.348

336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.

Id.
Id.
Id. ¶¶ 5-8, 901 N.W.2d at 66-67.
Schwartzenberger, ¶ 5, 901 N.W.2d at 66.
Id.
Id. ¶ 8, 901 N.W. 2d at 67.
Id. ¶ 6.
Id.
Id. ¶ 7.
Schwartzenberger, ¶ 7, 901 N.W.2d at 67.
Id. ¶ 9, 901 N.W.2d at 67-68.
Id.
Id. ¶ 10, 901 N.W.2d at 68.
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The Court ruled in favor of Schwartzenberger and held that the Board had
no authority to discipline or fire local sheriff’s office employees.349
The Court used the North Dakota Century Code § 11-11-11(1) and (2)
to determine that the Board had the “authority to superintend the fiscal affairs of the county and to supervise the conduct of the respective county officers, including the sheriff.”350 Additionally, the Court used a North Dakota Attorney General’s opinion as persuasive authority to reach its
holding.351 The Attorney General’s opinion states that a board of county
commissioners could not remove or restrict a county officer’s power to terminate an employee hired by that officer.352 In interpreting the natural language of the statue, the Attorney General’s opinion reasoned that since the
county officer has the power to appoint or hire employees, the county officer also has the power to fire said employees.353 Thus, the Court held that
the sheriff had the power to discipline his sheriff’s office employees.354
Lastly, in holding that the Board lacked authority, the Court used persuasive authority from other jurisdictions that had similar statutes to determine powers of county boards and sheriffs.355 In Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v.
Neilander, the Kansas Supreme Court held that the board can implement
personal policies for county employees, but the sheriff holds the power to
discipline employees.356 Accordingly, the Court used the Neilander ruling
as persuasive authority because it was consistent with the North Dakota Attorney General’s opinion.357 As a result, the Court reversed the district
court’s judgment and determined that the Board could not discipline or terminate a deputy in the Sheriff’s office.358
Hence, the sheriff, not the Board, has the authority to discipline and
terminate sheriff’s office employees.359 The Court reversed the district
court’s ruling because the district court misapplied the law in determining
who has the authority to discipline and terminate sheriff’s office employees.360 As a result, that Court explained that Schwartzenberger should have
349. Id. ¶ 22, 901 N.W.2d at 71.
350. Id. ¶ 13, 901 N.W.2d at 69 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 11-11-11(1) and (2) (2017)
(“The board of county commissioners: 1. Shall superintend the fiscal affairs of the county. 2. Shall
supervise the conduct of the respective county officers.”)).
351. Schwartzenberger, ¶ 17, 901 N.W.2d at 69-70.
352. Id. (citing N.D. Op. Att’y Gen. 1997-L-32).
353. Id.
354. Id. ¶ 20, 901 N.W.2d at 71.
355. Id. ¶ 18, 901 N.W.2d at 70.
356. Id.; see Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. Nielander, 62 P.3d 247, 251-54 (Kan. 2003).
357. Schwartzenberger, ¶ 20, 901 N.W.2d at 71.
358. Id. ¶ 23.
359. Id. ¶ 22.
360. Id. ¶ 23.
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received a writ of prohibition, which would have prohibited the Board from
having the power to terminate and discipline a sheriff’s office employee.361

361. Id., 901 N.W.2d at 71-72.

